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STATE COMPACTS AS A METHOD OF SETTLING PROBLEMS
COMMON TO SEVERAL STATES *
WILLIAM

J.

DONOVAN I

In a system of government involving the existence of forty-eight
sovereign states it is inevitable that disputes will arise between the states.
These disputes involve not only questions of balance of power between
state and federal organizations, but also controversies which are in their
nature the subject of common concern to more than one state while not
presenting issues affecting the entire nation. We find examples today in
such problems as extradition, jurisdiction over harbors which contain in
their limits the boundaries of more than one state, the wholesale interstate
transmission of power and riparian rights in interstate rivers. The development of our territory and the growth and intensification of our industrial
life present new regional and sectional problems.
As these problems arise, we look to the Constitution to ascertain if
not the specific means at least the basic philosophy for dealing with them.
We find that the framers anticipating that interstate disputes would arise,
embodied in the fundamental law not the theoretical function of an Utopian
state, nor particular remedies for specific problems, but certain practical and
flexible means that they believed were suited to conditions in a new and
constantly growing country.
Under the Constitution, there are three methods of determining disputes between states. One means is by direct legislation of Congress. This
method is limited to that field where the states have granted that right
under the Constitution. Examples are found in the authority of the Congress to legislate in regard to navigable state waters and in the field of
interstate commerce. This method does not afford a comprehensive means
of settling all disputes between the states.
The second method, that of litigation, is governed by the provisions
of Article Three of the Constitution. Section 2 of Article Three provides,
among other things, that "The judicial Power shall extend
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troversies between two or more States."
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The cases under this provision decided by the Supreme Court have
been collected and annotated. They are about seventy-five in number and
deal principally with boundary disputes, extradition, public health and
riparian rights in interstate rivers. Such cases by their scope exact of the
Supreme Court a terrific price in time and labor. Out of the necessity of
narrowing the controversy to a legal issue, the result is too often unsatisfactory. Not all matters in dispute between the states can be settled by
judicial determination. The Supreme Court has recognized its own limitations and has suggested in more than one case that the party states seek
t'ieir remedy by conference and agreement. Many problems by their very
nature demand continuous supervision and local control. Sporadic litigation
does not in such cases afford a satisfactory remedy.
The third method, that of settlement of disputes between the states
by means of compacts, also has its source in the Constitution. Article i,
Section IO, subdivision 3, provides in part: "No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power . . ." The records of the Con-

stitutional Convention fail to show exactly what the framers intended by
this provision. However, history discloses that with the growth of the
colonies prior to the Revolution, disputes as to boundaries frequently arose.
Two distinct methods of settling such conflicts were pursued. One method
was in effect that of present-day litigation. This involved laying the dispute before the Crown, which resulted usually in the appointment of a
royal Commission to hear the dispute. When the Commission rendered its
decision, either party might appeal to the privy council. The other method
was by negotiation and agreement. When the contending colonies reached
an agreement, it was necessary to secure the approval of the Crown. That
approval sanctioned and validated the agreement arrived at by negotiation.
It may be that the existing provision of the Constitution was intended to
perpetuate that mode of settlement.
A distinction may be drawn between the requirements of subdivision
3 of Section io and the prohibition contained in subdivision i of the same
section which provides inter alia that "No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance or Confederation .

.

."

In order to establish the sovereignty

of the Union for purposes of international relations, it was essential that
the states should not enter into any alliance or confederation and that
treaties should be entered into only by the federal government. A treaty
between the states would in itself be destructive of national sovereignty.
A compact or agreement, however, would not necessarily be destructive of
national sovereignty although it might involve issues affecting the entire
nation. So it is that, while Congress cannot authorize the state to enter
into any treaty, alliance or confederation, agreements between the states
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may be made and to protect the national interests it is provided that the
consent of Congress must be obtained. Such consent may be given before
or after the agreement is entered into.
The compact itself may be the result of direct legislative acts. In
these cases the legislature of one state makes an offer which is accepted by
an act of the legislature of another state. The agreement so arrived at
constitutes a compact between the states provided, of course, that the consent of Congress is obtained. This method is practicable only where the
problems involved are simple. Complex problems cannot be readily dealt
with by action of the legislature and can best be solved through negotiations
conducted by commissioners having the benefit of expert technical advice.
A study of the actual cases in which the compact method has been
used indicates that it is a fruitful means of settling disputes between states.,
The compact has been used with marked success in settling disputes as to
boundaries and jurisdiction over boundary waters for specific purposes.
It provided a method for solving the differences between Kansas and Missouri in the erection, operation and maintenance of water works. In this
manner Virginia and Maryland dealt with mutual problems in the regulation of navigation, fishing and the exercise of jurisdiction over the waters
of the Potomac River. It was utilized by New York and New Jersey to
effect the construction and operation of tunnels between those states. By
this means the same states were able to adjust their differences in regard
to jurisdiction over New York Harbor and to provide a comprehensive
plan for the continuous development of the port. The compact in that case
provided for the creation of a commission to be known as the "Port of
New York Authority" and full administrative powers were conferred upon
this commission in order that it might be equipped to deal effectively with
problems common to both states involved in the development of the harbor.
Just as nations have composed their differences concerning interriational
rivers by treaty, so the interstate compact has had its greatest development
in the dealing with the rivers of the Western states. It is said that of the
twenty-six states east of the Mississippi, the rivers of ten are covered by
compacts and of the twenty-two states west of the Mississippi, twenty are
involved in river compact negotiations.
The compacts respecting these western rivers evolved from interstate
river litigation over a period of twenty-five years. In the west while land
is plentiful, water is scarce. All the large rivers flow through or have their
tributaries in two or more states. The inevitable recurrence of dry years
produced conditions out of which arose prolonged, expensive and extremely
unsatisfactory litigation. The Western states learned that litigation when
'A compilation of interstate compacts has been made by a pioneer in the compact field,
CARPENTER, INTERSTATE RIVER COmPACrS.
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finally determined did not settle questions which went far beyond the domain
of a particular lawsuit. They saw also that by this failure to settle their
difficulties they were opening the way for the assertion by the federal government of control over water rights. They found in their litigation federal representatives contending that the United States owns and may control
and dispose of the waters of the western rivers regardless of the will of
the states. These considerations brought home to them the immediate
need of a more comprehensive method of solving their river problems.
The first river case in which an interstate compact was used by those
states was in the South Platte controversy, 2 involving Nebraska and
Colorado. The suggestion of a compact was then made by Delph Carpenter, counsel for Colorado. This was the pioneer move in that field.
Although negotiations began in 1916 they were not concluded until 1923
and approved by Congress in 1926. In the meantime other compacts had
been instituted and completed.
The latest of these agreements, the Rio Grande compact, made between New Mexico, Texas and Colorado, was approved in June, 193o, by
Congress.3 It determined the rights of the three states to the waters of
the Rio Grande for five years and laid the foundation for the permanent
settlement of a controversy of long standing.
The greater part of the large irrigation projects in the west are interstate in character. They are located upon interstate rivers and their uninterrupted development necessitates the determination in advance of rights,
in order to avoid litigation. Capital will not invest in securities for power,
for irrigation or other purposes based on uncertain titles to the use of
waters of interstate rivers. All these problems can be determined in advance by agreement. In actual practice by the use of this method there
have been settled vital matters to the Western states such as: preference
of uses in times of water scarcity, guarantees that more important uses
will be served over less imperative demands, assurance of sufficient water
to supply the future needs of states in which the streams originate and
provision of adequate supply for essentials in states in the lower reaches of
the rivers. By this means the whole river system is developed in a manner
best calculated to obtain the maximum benefits from the common water
supply. Boards are appointed to control and administer uses, enforce prohibitions and oversee the most effective disposition of the streams to the
benefit of the territory as a whole.
In order to understand fully the water problem of the West it is essential to understand the system of water law generally governing the uses of
water in that section. As distinct from our riparian system they have what
I South Platte
'72 CONG.

River Compact, 44 STAT. 195 (I926).
8579, i043i, 11162 (i930).
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is called the rule of priority or of appropriation. Under either system, a
water right is not ownership of the water itself as it exists in the natural
source of supply, but rather of a right to make use of the water. But in
other respects they differ radically. The basic principle of the riparian
system is that of equality among the riparian proprietors not of an equal
amount, but an amount which, under all the circumstances would constitute
an equitable division of the waters. The priority system on the contrary
is based not on equality but on discrimination--discrimination in favor of
the prior user or, as he is called, appropriator. In this system it is the first
user who obtains the highest right and he need not be a riparian owner.
The priority system and mining law are the two bodies of substantive
law given to American jurisprudence by the West.
The priority system is said to have inaugurated with the "FortyNiners." It spread from mining uses to irrigation purposes and today
seventeen states enforce the system either wholly or in part and allow the
waters to be used for all beneficial purposes. The earliest reported case
sustaining this doctrine was Eddy v. Simpson,4 decided in 1853. The first
legislative recognition was by the State of California in 1851 and by the
United States by the Act of July 26, I866,' when the public was permitted
to mine in the public domain. The first judicial decision of the United
States Supreme Court was in Atchison v. Peterson 1 in 1874.
It is generally doubted that Congress has the power to provide for the
settlement of an interstate stream controversy. The Supreme Court by
virtue of its original jurisdiction of such a dispute may formulate a principle in deciding suits between the States. It has so far evolved two doctrines. They were stated in the cases of Kansas v. Colorado,7 and Wyoming v. Colorado." The first case was Kansas v. Colorado. Kansas was a
riparian state and Colorado a priority state. The Court there held that an
equitable division of water should be made between the two states, regardless of state lines, by taking into account the volume of flow, the periods of
flow, the needs of the two states, the present use of water, and the future
demands which might be made upon the stream. In Wyoming v. Colorado,
the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of priority that obtains in both
states. Here they ascertained the average commercially dependable flow
of the river, created a water fund and divided all the water in the fund between the states in order of the establishment of prior rights and without
regard to state lines.
'3 CoL 249 (1853).
14 STAT. 253 (i868), 30oU. S. C. A. § 51 (1927), 43 U. S. C. A. § 661 (1928).
'20 Wall. 5o7 (U. S. 1874).
'2o6 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (907).
b 2.59 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 552 (1922).
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As a result of the decision in Wyoming v. Colorado laying down the
principle of interstate priority rather than equitable division between states,
it was feared that every federal irrigation or reclamation or power project
upon an interstate stream would precipitate a conflict among all the states
upon that stream. In such a situation there must be some method by which
all issues can be determined, and a plan worked out by which future differences can be reconciled.
The present controversy over allocation of water and the development
of the water power of the Colorado River furnishes an illustration. It
cannot be solved by the action of a single state or by congressional legislation alone. It exemplifies the importance of statecraft in the settlement of
such problems.
The Colorado River, 1293 miles in length, is the third largest river
on the continent. Not only is it an interstate stream but it is international
as well. It has its source in Colorado and flows south and west through
the states of Utah and Wyoming, forms part of the western boundary of
Arizona and the eastern boundary of Nevada, California and Mexico. It
flows through Mexico a distance of seventy-five miles and empties into the
Gulf of California. The river is fed by tributaries from New Mexico and
all these named states excepting California.
The drainage basin of the river has a total area of 244,000 square
miles. All of the land in this drainage basin is arid in character, so that in
order to grow crops irrigation is necessary. The welfare and prosperity
of this great southwestern plateau is largely dependent upon the river. The
future growth and progress of the region are greatly contingent upon the
reclamation and irrigation of additional land in each state.
In 1921, in recognition of their common problem and in an effort to
avoid litigation and controversy between the states, the states concerned and
the federal government enacted legislation providing for the appointment
of commissioners by the governors of those states and by the President of
the United States to negotiate a compact for the equitable apportionment
of the waters of the Colorado River.
In 1922 a compact was finally entered into under the terms of which
the river system was divided into two basins. The upper, comprising generally Utah, Wyoming, Colorado and New Mexico, and the lower, which
included Arizona, California and Nevada. It was assumed that there were
approximately i8,ooo,ooo acre feet of water in the river and 7,500,000
acre feet were apportioned to each of these basins with the provision that
at a later period there would be further equitable apportionment. The
theory of the compact was that although the upper basin states did not use
all of the water allocated to their use, they would be free to proceed with
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their development both for power and for irrigation, and yet leave to the
lower basin states water sufficient for their needs.
Water which could be applied to agricultural and domestic uses was
not to be withheld. Navigation was made subservient to domestic, agricultural and power purposes, while power use was to be subservient to
agricultural and domestic uses. The allocation of the water of the two
basins was to be made by separate agreements entered into by the states
located in each basin.
It was necessary to have the compact ratified by the several states concerned and by the federal government. Arizona would not ratify at all and
California ratified only conditionally until the states of the lower basin
would enter into an agreement governing the division of waters among the
three states of the lower basin.
In the meantime there had been introduced in Congress the so-called
Swing-Johnson Bill or Boulder-Canyon Project Act." This Act was passed
in December, 1928. It included three principal features. (i) A large dam
and reservoir at Boulder or Black Canyon with a storage capacity of
26,ooo,ooo acre feet; (2) a canal fifty-five miles long to be located entirely
within the United States and designed to carry a water supply from the
Colorado River to the Imperial and Coachella Valleys in California; (3) a
power plant at the dam for the development of electric energy from the
waters stored in the reservoir.
By this, it was hoped to solve the flood problem of the lower river,
which was a constant danger to the Imperial Valley; to conserve and regulate the flood waters of the river, prevent destruction and make those waters
available for the irrigation of lands and to carry a supply of water to Los
Angeles and to other cities of southern California for domestic uses. Also,
it was assumed that the electric energy which the impounding of the water
would make possible would afford a basis for recovery of the cost of the
dam and power plant. The passage of this bill was fought by Arizona, but
after its passage, negotiations were resumed for the settlement of the problem of the lower basin. Under the terms of the bill, 10 if the seven states
did not ratify within a certain period, the compact was to go into effect on
a six state basis. Arizona did not ratify the compact, and in accordance
with the terms of the bill, the project is now being built upon a six state
compact. As a result Arizona instituted a proceeding against all the other
states and against the Secretary of the Interior. She attacked the compact
itself because of its inequitable division of water and asserted further that
because she has not ratified the compact it is void and of no effect; that
upon the ground that this act is in excess of the powers granted to Congress
Ap45

STAT. 1057 (1929), 43 U. S. C. A. §§ 617-617t (1930).
1045 STAT. io58 (I929), 43 U. S. C. A. §617c (1930).
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by the Constitution of the United States it is unconstitutional and void,
because it attempts to deprive the State of Arizona of its sovereign jurisdiction and control of the water within its state, to subject the state to the
Colorado River Compact without its consent and to deprive the state of its
right to levy and collect taxes and the business of storing and selling water
taken from the tributaries of its state."
Secretary Wilbur and the defendant states filed a motion to dismiss
Arizona's bill of complaint, and the case was argued before the Supreme
Court March 9th and ioth. On May 18, 1931, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in which it upheld the motion to dismiss the bill of complaint on the grounds (inter alia) that as the river is navigable and the
means which the act provides are not unrelated to the control of navigation,
the intended project is clearly within the powers conferred by Congress
and at present there is no threatened physical interference with any irrigation project approved under the Arizona Law. The court went on to state
that if the operations of the dam when it was completed should interfere
with any perfected right of Arizona, appropriate remedies would still be
2
available to that state.'
This controversy brings into very sharp outline the struggle going on
in the western states by reason of their water problems. While it clearly
defines the point of disagreement between Arizona and her sister states,
there is nothing in the case that constitutes an argument against the use of
the compact. In point of fact, it shows the only basis upon which six of
those seven states could agree; and still maintain the fullest measure of
their sovereignty. It is an outstanding demonstration of the method in
which a great empire is being built up, by the recognition in these political
bodies of their common economic interest. The manner of dealing with
this water problem of the southwest forms a striking example, which might
well be followed by the eastern states in meeting questions peculiar to this
region. Particularly do these questions arise by reason of the tremendous
growth of electrical energy and its wholesale transmission across state lines.
Electrical energy is a vital force of modern civilization. The potentialities involved in its development may be illustrated by reference to certain testimony before the New York Commission on Revision of the Public
Service Commissions Law. This testimony showed the possible future construction of vast systems of generating plants, transmission lines and distributing systems, which would completely absorb plants formerly operating
" Arizona claimed that in passing the act, Congress exceeded the powers given to it under
Article I, § 9, of the Constitution. See brief of complainant (Arizona) in opposition to motions to dismiss the bill of complaint. See also Arizona v. California, infra note 12, at 446
Ct Seq.
' Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522 (1931).
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over a comparatively small area. This would result in the transmission
across state lines of huge quantities of electrical power.
A force so necessary to the service of the people must be restricted
in the public interest. In that restriction we must have regard not only to
the interest of the general public but of the companies themselves and to the
investors in those companies.
The difficulties involved in regulation by the state are accentuated by
the fact that the companies transmitting such power wholesale across state
lines, are usually holding companies, beyond any control of the state, if not
the federal government.
In the field of wholesale interstate transmission of power, the Supreme
Court has said that in the absence of legislation by Congress, the several
states have no authority to regulate 13 because such regulation would be a
direct burden upon interstate commerce.
However, in the case of the sale of natufal gas at retail in New York,
even where such gas is produced in another state and transported into New
York for sale directly to local consumers, the power of New York to regulate the rates for such gas, in the absence of Congressional action, has been
upheld on the ground that such commerce is not national in character and
does not require general or uniform legislation by Congress.' 4 It has been
suggested that a compact between states which would deal with wholesale
interstate transmission of power, even though approved by Congress, would
be unconstitutional as in violation of the commerce clause.
This phase of the subject has been fully treated in an article by Felix
Frankfurter and James Landis.'5 The authorities collected in that article
substantiate the view that agreements between the states for the control of
this problem, sanctioned by Congress, would not be in violation of the commerce clause. A compact dealing with a question common to the states
concerned and facilitating the regulation within each state of a problem
peculiar to itself instead of casting a burden upon interstate commerce constitutes aid to the federal government in dealing with that commerce. And
when Congress gives sanction to the compact, it is equivalent to legislation
by Congress.
Certainly if the view is accepted that under the decision in the Clark
Distilling Case,'6 Congress has power under the commerce clause by affirmative legislation to permit the states to severally regulate wholesale interstate
"Public Util. Com. of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct.
294 (1927).
I Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Com. of N. Y., 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279
(192o).
I Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution--A Study in Interstate Aditustments (1925) 34 YAT- L. J. 685.

' Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co. and State of W. Va., Clark Distilling
Co. v. American Express Co. and State of W. Va., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 18o (917).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

transmission of power, then it would follow that the states would be free
to enter into compacts dealing with this subject. This view is discussed by
Professor Noel T. Dowling and William C. Scott.1 7 If this view be accepted, then it is clear that authorization of such compacts by Congress
would, by providing such affirmative legislation, remove any barriers to
state action contained in the commerce clause.
It has been urged on the other hand that a Federal Cormmission be set
up which would fix rates for power transmitted across a state line and to
supervise the method of finance and control of holding companies engaged
in interstate transactions. By this method a holding company which sells
power to a distributing company across a state line will have the rates fixed
by a federal agency.
This proposal involves further. concentrated governmental control. It
would tend further to undermine the authority and economy of local government. It would mean the intervention in local affairs by an authority
far removed from the immediate problems and unfamiliar with the local
conditions. Yet some such federal commission is inevitable unless the States
of the various sections with a common problem join in an effort to meet
that problem themselves rather than submit to an outside agency.
Recognizing the need for joint action, representatives of New York,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania met in 1925 for the purpose of studying the
regulation of interstate electricity. This group failed to reach a solution
because New York disagreed and submitted a memorandum in explanation
of its refusal which failed to recognize the purpose and uses and flexibility
of a compact. As counsel for the Commission on Revision of the Public
Service Commissions Law, the writer was called upon to examine witnesses
in regard to the desirability and feasibility of such a compact. These witnesses, representing what may be termed both the utilities and public point
of view generally admitted the desirability and feasibility of some such
plan. In the writer's report to that commission, it was suggested that a
body, designated by the State of New York and independent of the Public
Service Commission, be appointed to make a general survey of the needs
of the state and of the unification of services with other states. The
desirability of such a survey has been recognized by the New York legislature and a bill was passed at the 1931 session providing for the creation
of such a commission.'
The results of this survey may well show that it
' Dowling, State Control of Interstate Power Transmission-The Doctrine of Congressional Permission (May, 1930) v. XIV, no. i PROC. ACAD. POL. Sci. 132; Scott, State and
Federal Control of Power Transmission as Affected by the Interstate Conmwrce Clause, ibid.
135.

s N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 673.
This temporary commission was formed to act in conjunction with similar commissions
of the states adjoining New York for the purpose of making a survey of utility companies
engaged in interstate transmission of power, and by treaties between the several states and the
federal government to effectually regulate and control interstate transmission.
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is only by means of negotiation and agreement with other states that New
York can hope to solve her power problems.
Because of its flexibility in adapting methods of control to the particular problems of the localities concerned, the use of the compact could
be greatly extended.
In an address before the Oil Relief Conference,' 9 January I6th, called
by the governors of the oil-producing states, Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary
of the Interior, reviewed the conditions prevailing in the oil industry as a
result- of overproduction and stated that he saw "no substantial lasting
remedy except that of a compact between the oil-producing states, approved
by Congress, so that there will be fair play, reasonable and sensible planning,
unit operation where possible, and a proper protection of seasoned and
established oil-producing areas when they come in contact with flush field."
Regulation of the liquor traffic which is peculiarly dependent upon the varying customs and attitude of mind of the inhabitants of different localities,
particularly lends itself to this method of control.
The importance of the use of the compact is, however, not confined
to its adaptability to problems essentially local or regional. It can be made
an effective instrument for the preservation and restoration to the states
of local control and administration of local problems. A survey of the
present and probable future demands upon federal regulatory and enforcement agencies forcibly indicates that it will be physically impossible for the
machinery of the federal government to carry the tremendous burden. The
enforcement of prohibition, the regulation of rates, practices and service
of railroads and the consideration of plans for their consolidation, the development of water power resources and the myriad obligations now imposed upon the central government furnish ample evidence that it cannot
be called upon to assume all of the burden and all of the responsibility. But,
even should the federal government be provided with the funds necessary
to effect the huge and intricate organization that would be required, it could
not be supposed that federal action would result in as harmonious or as
effective a working out of these problems as the combined efforts of the
states concerned. The political philosophy underlying these problems was
aptly expressed early in the nineteenth century by Alexis de Tocqueville: 20
"The partisans of centralization in Europe are wont to maintain
that the government can administer the affairs of each locality better
than the citizens could do it for themselves: this may be true, when
the central power is enlightened, and the local authorities are ignorant;
when it is alert, and they are slow; when it is accustomed to act, and
they to obey. Indeed, it is evident that this double tendency must
augment with the increase of centralization, and that the readiness of
New York Times, Jan. 17, 1931, at 4.
DE
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the one and the incapacity of the others must become more and more
prominent. But I deny that it is so, when the people are as enlightened,
as awake to their interests, and as accustomed to reflect on them, as
the Americans are. I know it is difficult to point out with certainty
the means of arousing a sleeping population. . . . But whenever a
central administration affects completely to supersede the persons most
interested, I believe that it is either misled, or desirous to mislead.
However enlightened and skillful a central power may be, it cannot
of itself embrace all the details of the life of a great nation.
Its force deserts it, when society is to be profoundly
moved, or accelerated in its course; and if once the co-operation of
private citizens is necessary to the furtherance of its measures, the
secret of its impotence is disclosed. Even whilst the centralized power,
in its despair, invokes the assistance of the citizens, it says to them:
'You shall act just as I please, as much as I please, and in the direction
which I please. You are to take charge of the details, without aspiring to guide the system; you are to work in darkness; and afterwards
you may judge my work by its results.' These are not the conditions
on which the alliance of the human will is to be obtained.
"
Today the United States is a union of individual regions. State lines
are boundaries of political demarcation and do not coincide with larger
regional boundaries of which the state is a part. Regional areas exist as
the result of elementary physical and social conditions. Men living in the
same area have identical forces of nature to combat, similar problems of
adjustment to solve, and possess as a result common customs, viewpoints
and economic aims. Our nation includes a vast domain of varied territory.
Though we possess a common language, there exists a wide diversity of
regional characteristics. The problems of the deserts in the southwest are
peculiarly their own. The densely populated areas of the eastern seaboard
do not have the same situations to meet that confront the agricultural areas
of the midwest, the grain and timber lands of the northwest or the cotton
plantations of the south. Each one is an empire in itself, and each one
embraces several states.
States in order to function more completely in their local affairs must
be able to work in harmony with those neighboring states possessing the
same aims and characteristics.
Regional considerations so vital to the fullest development of a homogeneous territory in this way can be given thorough and comprehensive
treatment. The federal government relieved of a measure of its burden
can function more completely within those fields in which it is a necessary
and vital agency. Rivalries and inadequacies of litigation can be supplanted
by conference and compromise based on scientific and practical information,
and a finer balance of power can be developed between state and nation.

